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The focus of this paper is to examine the law giving relief from "unfair" contracts in New 
Zealand. This involves the equitable doctrines of unconscionability and undue influence and 
the Credit Contracts Act 1981. The aim of the paper is to assess problems with the existing 
law and suggest workable solutions - whether legislative or judicial. In doing this, the paper 
looks initially at some of the recent case law in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and 
Australia. This unveils an unacceptable degree of uncertainty as to when a court will strike 
down a contract and the basis upon which such a decision will be made. 
The paper goes on to examine two different developments suggested in the area -
rationalisation of the common law and legislative codification. The Credit Contracts Act 1981 
is then critiqued to assess its performance against its aims. Suggestions for reform are 
mooted with a consumer credit law focus. Finally the paper considers an alternative avenue 
for practical accessibility to the law for the consumer. 
The paper argues that legislative reform is necessary for the consumer as the Act is not giving 
the necessary protection. For other groups in society the paper contends the common law 
gives sufficient protection and legislative interference gives rise to too much uncertainty. 
However developments for the common law to aid clarity and certainty are also mooted. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography comprises 
approximately 15,612 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court must balance the desirability of protecting vulnerable persons from loss of their 
assets , particularly their homes , against the undesirability of economically sterilising those 
assets . Sympathy for a victim of undue influence or misrepresentation [ or 
unconscionability or "oppressive" conduct] should not lead a Court into the error of 
imposing upon lenders an unrealistic standard. 1 
Relief from "unfair" contracts in New Zealand connotes three primary areas of law: the 
equitable doctrines of unconscionability and undue influence and the Credit Contracts Act 
1981 ("the Act"). There is a great deal of overlap between these concepts. All seek to 
prevent impropriety, both in the conduct of the stronger party and in the terms of the 
transaction itself which, in the traditional phrase, 'shocks the conscience of the court'. 
There are some indications that the doctrine of giving relief to unfair contracts originated in 
the 17th century: Ardglasse (Earl of) v. Muschamp (1683) 1 Vern. 238; Wieman v. Beake 
(1690) 2 Vern. 121. But the doctrine was developed mainly in the 19th century. Its most 
common application was in cases where moneylenders lent money on exorbitant terms to 
reversionists and remaindermen against their expectations. In Barret v. Hartley (1866) L.R. 
2 Eq. 789, 795 Stuart V.C. said that the courts would give a borrower relief against harsh 
and unconscionable terms or an oppressive bargain extracted by a lender. His Lordship 
emphasised that this doctrine became of increased importance after the repeal of the usury 
laws (which prevented the charging of interest). 2 
The Credit Contracts Act has been part of the New Zealand financing environment for some 
17 years. The Act was clearly a consumerist measure. The then Minister of Justice explained 
to Parliament that the Bill would protect consumers in two ways: by improving the 
information in the market and by prohibiting consumer abuse. 3 This philosophy is reflected 
in the long title of the Act, which details the following primary objectives of the legislation: 
(a) Prevent oppressive contracts and conduct; 
1 Wilkinson v. ASB Bank Ltd (1998) 6 NZBLC I 02,427 (CA), I 02,440 per Blanchard J. [" Wilkinson " ] 
2 Report of rh e Co111racr and Comm ercial Law Ref orm Commillee; Credir Conrracts (1977) para 7 .0 I 
["Report "] 
3 Hon. J. K. McLay , MP (25 September 1980) 433 NZPD 3686-3687 
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(b) Ensure that all the tenns of contracts are disclosed to debtors before they become 
irrevocably committed to them; 
(c) Ensure that the cost of credit is disclosed on a uniform basis in order to prevent deception 
and encourage competition; and 
(d) Prevent misleading credit advertisements. 
The enactment of this legislation was greeted with alarm and downright fear by some 
practitioners: 4 
On 1 June 1982 there will be delivered to the New Zealand public (largely now blissfully 
unsuspecting) a monster the like of which has not been seen anywhere else in the world - the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981. 
Others regarded the introduction of the Act as a significant victory for consumerism. Paul 
Darvell observed that, in giving courts the power to re-open oppressive contracts, the Act 
represented a "fundamental introduction of consumerism into the law relating to the 
provision of credit". 5 
Now, in 1998, Webb6 contends that there remains an unacceptable degree of uncertainty as to 
when a court will find a contract oppressive and the basis upon which such a decision will be 
made. Hammond Jin Prudential Building & Investment Society of Canterbwy v. Hankins1 
seems to suggest that the current approach to the concept of oppression has no firm 
jurisprudential foundation and is lacking in doctrinal basis. 
This paper seeks to examme some of the most recent cases (1996 onwards) in the 
unfair/oppressive contract area, firstly in New Zealand and then also in Australia and the 
United Kingdom. This analysis appears to the author to draw out the observations of Webb 
(above) (and not the balancing dicta of Blanchard J. in Wilkinson). Firstly, there is 
uncertainty and confusion in the area. Secondly the courts do not appear to make their 
decisions by reference to any single fundamental principle but rather proceed on an ad hoe 
4 Allen, W.H. "The Credit Contracts Act - New Zealand's Frankenstein monster" (1982) NZLJ 149 
["Frankenstein"] 
5 Darvell, P. (1980) "Reformed law will cover all solicitors' lending" Northern News Review, 5, No.JO, 1-2. 
Cited in Consumers Institute The reform of consumer credit law in New Zealand Consumers' Institute 
Report (Wellington, 1998), 8 ["Consumers ' Institute Report"] 
fi Webb, D "A proposed decision-making process for oppressive credit contracts" [ 1997] NZ Law Review 394, 
394 [ "proposed decision-making process"] 
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basis dealing with each case on its own facts with the court considering whether it is 
sufficiently similar to any previously decided case and, if not, whether the circumstances of 
the case are such that relief ought to be granted in any event. The analysis also demonstrates 
blatant inconsistencies in decisions with very similar facts. 
The writer will then examine two very different developments that have been suggested in 
the area of unfair contracts. The first being rationalisation of the common law and the second 
possible legislative codification. Both aim to enhance certainty and predictability whilst 
promoting a rigorous theoretical basis. 
The Credit Contracts Act is then critiqued to assess its performance against its aims. In this 
section, the author will analyse not only the oppression provisions but also the disclosure 
provisions of the Act. Suggestions for reform of the Act are mooted and discussed in an 
attempt to protect consumers whilst promoting freedom of contract and commercial reality. 
Finally, this paper looks at a potential alternative avenue for improving accessibility to the law 
for the consumer - the group most at risk from subjection to unfair contracts , in the form of 
the Banking Ombudsman. 
The author comes to the conclusion that reform is urgent and imperative. The Act as it stands 
is not protecting consumers, but it is producing uncertainty and unnecessarily impacting on 
business. Enforcement of and accessibility to the law must also be improved along with the 
substantive law itself and the common law can usefully be developed by rationalisation of the 
two equitable doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
A. Undue influence 
The essential features of the doctrine of undue influence were authoritatively stated by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in Barclays Bank Plc v. O 'Brien.R His Lordship distinguished between 
class 1 (actual undue influence) and class 2 (presumed undue influence) cases. The latter 
7 (1997] 1 NZLR 114, 124 ["Hankins " ] 
R (1994] 1 A.C. 180 ["O 'Brien"] 
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require proof of a relationship in which trust and confidence is reposed by the plaintiff in the 
defendant, and that the transaction concluded between them is to the plaintiff's manifest 
disadvantage.9 On proof of these elements the defendant must show that the plaintiff made an 
informed decision and that the transaction was the plaintiff's genuine wish, otherwise it is set 
aside. Class 2 is subdivided into class 2A cases, where there are certain relationships that 
raise the presumption (such as solicitor/client, trustee/beneficiary, and doctor/patient), and 
others ( class 2B) where the plaintiff has to prove on the facts that the necessary trust and 
confidence was present. Class I cases are those where the plaintiff must prove that actual 
undue influence was exerted by the defendant and that the plaintiff entered into the transaction 
because of it. No presumption is raised against the defendant and the plaintiff does not need 
to show that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to him or her. 
B. Unconscionability 
Five factors normally present in a case of unconscionability, as classically understood, were 
proposed by Tipping J. in Bowkett v. Action Finance Ltd:w 
"(I) The weaker party is under a significant disability; 
(2) The stronger party knows or ought to know of the disability; 
(3) The stronger party has victimised the weaker in the sense of taking advantage of the 
weaker's disability, either by active extortion of the bargain or passive acceptance of it in 
circumstances where it is contrary to conscience that the bargain should be accepted; 
( 4) There is a marked inadequacy of consideration and the stronger party either knows or 
ought to know that to be so; 
(5) There is some procedural impropriety either demonstrated or presumed from the 
circumstances" 
C. Credit Contracts Act 1981 
Section I O of the Credit Contracts Act enables a Court to reopen a contract and give relief if a 
'credit contract' is oppressive, if a party exercises a right or power conferred by the contract 
in an oppressive manner, or if a party has induced another to enter into the contract by 
oppressive means. 'Credit contract' is defined widely in section 3 as essentially a contract in 
which credit is offered and a charge is imposed. Interest-free credit contracts are therefore 
9 In C!BC Mortgages Pie v. Pitt [1994] 1 A.C. 200 at p209 ["Pitt " ], Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed that 
the requirement of manifest disadvantage may have to be looked at again in future. 
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not covered by the Act . Section 9 states that a contract may be oppressive whenever it is 
"oppressive, harsh, unconscionable, unjustly burdensome, or in contravention of reasonable 
standards of commercial practice". 
Ill. RECENT CASE LAW 
A. 0 'Brien and Pitt 
In Barclays Bank v. 0 'Brien the House of Lords considered the competing interests that the 
law must reconcile when dealing with cases where a wife becomes surety for her husband. 11 
A transaction procured by undue influence can be set aside against the creditor if the 
wrongdoing spouse is the agent of the creditor or if the creditor has actual or constructive 
knowledge of undue influence. A creditor is put on inquiry if a transaction is not for a 
spouse's benefit or there is a substantial risk that in procuring the wife to act as surety the 
husband has col111llitted a legal or equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the 
transaction. Unless a creditor who is put on inquiry takes reasonable steps to satisfy himself 
that the wife's agreement to stand surety has been properly obtained, the creditor will have 
constructive notice of the wife's equity to set aside the transaction. Reasonable steps for His 
Lordship consisted of the creditor insisting that the wife attend a private meeting (in the 
absence of her husband) with a representative of the creditor at which she is told of the extent 
of her liability as surety, warned of the risk she is running and urged to take independent 
legal advice. In cases where a creditor has knowledge of further facts which render the 
presence of undue influence "not only possible, but probable", the creditor must insist on 
independent advice. 12 
Rickett and McLauchlan have criticised the approach of his Lordship as having pragmatic 
appeal, but lacking in conceptual coherence: 13 
10 [1992] I NZLR 449, 460 
11 See discussion in Section II. above for the different classes of undue influence as laid down by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Note also that although the principles are stated in terms of married parties, His Lordship made it 
clear (at 198) that they apply to all other cases where there is an emotional relationship between cohabitees, 
including those of the same sex. 
12 O'Brien, above n8, 196-197 
13 Rickett, C.E.F. ; McLauchlan, D.W. "Undue influence, Financiers and Third Parties: A doctrine in transition 
or the emergence of a new doctrine?" [ 1995] NZ Law Review 328; 344, 346. ["Undue Influence and Third 
Pam·es"] 
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Although premised on notice, because it is discussed within the dimensions of equity, the test 
conceived by Lord Browne-Wilkinson seems concerned with the recognition of a duty on the 
creditor to take positive steps to safeguard the interests of the particular persons included 
within the class at risk 
and later: 
It really is very difficult to escape the conclusion that, regardless of Lord Browne-Wilkinson's 
disclaimers, the O ' Brien test is no more than an extended version of the special equity theory 
dressed up in notice terminology. 
The "special equity theory": 14 
[C]onsiders that equity affords special protection to a protected class of surety viz. those where 
the relationship between the debtor and the surety is such that influence by the debtor over the 
surety and reliance by the surety on the debtor are natural features of the relationship. 
This was expressly rejected by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in favour of a more general approach 
which his Lordship felt was not only more principled in terms of the nature of equity, but 
would also provide protection of the legitimate interests of those who would otherwise 
benefit as recipients of the special equity. 15 
In a decision heard by the same Appellate Cornrruttee and decided the same day CIBC 
Mortgages plc v. Pitt16 the case of a loan to a husband and wife (as distinct from surety 
transactions) was considered. The bank had lent money to Mr and Mrs Pitt secured over their 
jointly owned house in the belief that they would use it to buy a holiday home. The wife had 
signed a loan application to that effect but did not read it or the bank's loan offer which 
mentioned this purpose. In fact, having exerted pressure on his wife to obtain her consent to 
the borrowing, the husband used most of the money to buy shares in his own name, losing 
heavily in the market crash of 1987. Although undue influence was established the Bank had 
no notice of it as there was no indication that the transaction was anything other than a normal 
advance to Mr and Mrs Pitt for their joint benefit. The bank was not put on inquiry and could 
not be fixed with constructive notice of the undue influence. 
14 0 'Brien, above n8, 187-1 88 
15 O'Brien , above n8 , 195 
16 Pitt, above n9 
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Andrew Beck notes: "It is important that all cases involving security by partners for business 
debts now be viewed in the context of Barclays Bank v. 0 'Brien". 11 The author agrees but 
notes the potential ambit of O'Brien is wider than merely security by partners for business 
debts. Further regard must be had to the restriction on the doctrine as articulated by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson again in Pitt. 
B. New Zealand cases 
1. Exercise of power or right in an oppressive manner 
In Taylor & A nor. v. Westpac Banking Corporation ( 1996) 5 NZBLC 104, 104 the 
appellants had purchased a commercial building in 1987. To finance the acquisition they took 
out a Joan from Westpac which in tum, took a first mortgage over that and three other 
properties owned by the appellants. The loan became due for repayment in September 199 5. 
At that time the appellants were negotiating with the tenants for a new lease of the premises 
and with prospective purchasers for the sale of the tenanted building. Until these negotiations 
concluded, the appellants were unable to repay the loan and they requested Westpac delay 
exercising its power of sale. The Bank agreed to do so until February 1996. The appellants 
were still unable to pay by February and the Bank refused to delay the sale further. The 
appellants sought an injunction to prevent Westpac exercising its power of sale. They 
claimed the manner of the exercise of this power was oppressive in terms of section 10( 1 )(b) 
of the Credit Contracts Act 1981 as selling now would prejudice their negotiations and further 
that as the value of the property exceeded the outstanding loan, Westpac's security was not in 
danger and it would not be prejudiced by the delay. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and refused to grant the injunction. Thomas J. 
stated that the exercise of a power of sale by a lender is not inherently oppressive. However, 
other surrounding circumstances may make it so. 18 His Honour observed that the courts will 
not countenance the contention that the necessity or prudence of the mortgagee's decision to 
exercise its power of sale can be challenged whenever the security is adequate and a 
mortgagor considers that the sale should be delayed in order to obtain a higher price. Nor 
would the court second-guess Westpac's commercial wisdom in exercising its power of sale 
17 Beck, A "Contract" [ 1998] l NZ Law Review 25, 36 ["Contract 1 "] 
18 (1996) 5 NZBLC 104,104, 104,108 ["Taylor"] 
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at that time. 19 The Court concluded by commenting that Westpac was simply exercising a 
right conferred under the contract. The exercise of a power of sale will almost inevitably 
cause consequences which may appear harsh to the mortgagor. However, these are a normal 
consequence of the exercise of the power of sale and something additional will be required 
before the mortgagee's exercise of its power of sale is oppressive. 20 
This decision, although unsurprising on the facts (the Court of Appeal did not even believe 
the exercise by Wespac of its power of sale was unfair), is a prime illustration of the 
(laudable) reluctance of courts to interfere and second-guess a business' commercial 
decisions especially where experienced business people are involved. In the absence of 
anything to suggest the decision was unreasonable or outside the bounds of acceptable 
commercial practice the courts will refuse to interfere and not allow wealth tied up in the 
assets to become economically sterile. Westpac were well within their contractual rights to 
exercise their power of sale when they did, they had already delayed doing so at the request 
of the appellants, and they had done nothing which could be suggested to be procedurally 
unconscionable. 
2. All obligations security by partners for business debts. 
Both O'Brien and Pitt were important in the High Court's decision in Baxter v. The ANZ 
Banking Group (NZ) Ltd & Ors (1996) 5 NZBLC 104,281. The Bank provided finance for 
Mr Baxter's business with security over the matrimonial home. The Bank's solicitors 
insisted that Mrs Baxter be given independent advice, and introduced her to a solicitor for this 
purpose. The solicitor noted Mrs Baxter's belief that if she did not agree to the transaction 
her marriage would be at an end. Subsequently the Baxters separated after an abusive 
relationship, and Mr Baxter demanded that Mrs Baxter sign a document for an equity loan. 
The Bank agreed to this based on the existing mortgage. Mr Baxter also undertook further 
liability in respect of his company. The Bank conceded that it was placed on inquiry, and the 
question was the adequacy of advice provided. 
The Court held that the original transaction could not be attacked - by insisting on 
independent advice the Bank had taken reasonable steps in accordance with O'Brien. 
However with respect to the subsequent extension of credit, Mrs Baxter could not be said to 
have given her husband the freedom to enter into any future transaction he wished to, and the 
19 Taylor , Above nl8 , 104,108-104,109 
8 
Bank had allowed Mr Baxter's company to incur further debt without reference to Mrs 
Baxter. The Bank had therefore not ensured that she had knowledge of the risks she was 
running and an interim injunction was granted preventing the bank acting on its security in 
this respect. The Court held the equity loan was covered by Pitt and could not be challenged. 
Because the loan was ostensibly for domestic purposes, (rather than Mr Baxter's business) as 
in Pitt, the Bank had not been placed on inquiry of the possibility of undue influence and thus 
did not have to insist on independent advice. Mrs Baxter also pleaded causes of action under 
the Credit Contracts Act 1981 and s 9 of the Fair Trading Act. The Court held that there was 
a serious argument available to her under each of these in relation to the extension of security 
for the subsequent finance. 
This decision was the logical extension of O'Brien - independent advice is required for a 
jointly liable partner where there are subsequent dealings different from the original, relating 
back to previous security. Beck argues that the case also shows that the courts have adopted 
a pragmatic approach and are looking for substance rather than technical compliance with 
rules. 21 The case also highlights the "Pitt trap". There may be only the most slender of 
differences between situations where a spouse is able to escape liability, and one where 
liability is imposed. In this case the equity loan Mrs Baxter was forced to sign under physical 
pressure from her husband was to enable him to complete the purchase of a Ferrari. Because 
it was not for his business and the Bank had no knowledge of the marital discord, the Bank 
was able to enforce its security. Whereas, in respect of the subsequent guarantee of her 
husband's business debts, Mrs Baxter was able to escape liability. In neither case was the 
transaction for the financial benefit of Mrs Baxter nor did she receive independent advice. In 
situations like the instant, the Pitt exception to the O'Brien principle seems manifestly unfair 
and brings into question Beck's substance over form contention. 
Two later cases where the courts do not seem to have followed O'Brien are Dungey v. ANZ 
Banking Group (NZ) Ltd (1997) 6 NZBLC 102,194 and Clarke v. Westpac Banking 
Corporation ( 1997) 6 NZBLC 102,182. 
In Dungey Mrs Dungey went to the bank with her de facto partner, Mr D, to obtain overdraft 
finance for his business. The bank officer suggested a joint account, but Mrs Dungey did not 
appreciate that she would be liable for the whole of it by virtue of a mortgage she had already 
given. She received no independent advice. On Mr D's death, the bank claimed the $90,000 
20 Taylor, Above nl8, 104,110 
9 
owing from Mrs Dungey. The Court held that the bank would have had constructive 
knowledge of undue influence, but there was no evidence of any, either actual or presumed. 
Mrs Dungey succeeded, however, under the Fair Trading Act 1986. The Court accepted that 
the relationship was such as could give rise to a presumption of undue influence and one may 
question how this situation differs from O'Brien. Both parties visited the bank together and 
the transaction was freely entered into but it may be doubted whether that is sufficient to rebut 
the presumption of undue influence in light of the O'Brien principles. "It is suggested that 
the bank should have insisted on independent advice".22 
The Court concluded that it was misleading and deceptive (in terms of the Fair Trading Act) 
to recommend a joint account which entailed full liability for the debt, without explaining that 
this was entirely different from a guarantee. Doogue J. also found that the bank had also 
breached the Code of Banking Practice. Yet, notwithstanding this, there was no finding of 
"oppressive" conduct within the Credit Contracts Act 1981 . 
In Clarke, the Clarkes had mortgaged their property to secure a loan in 1980. In 1993, Mr 
Clarke borrowed further monev to invest in a companv, and gave a guarantee secured by the 
same mortgage. It appeared Mrs Clarke had no knowledge of these subsequent dealings. 
The Court held that the bank was under no duty to explain the effect of documents to 
customers, nor was it required to advise Mr Clarke to take independent advice when he 
signed the guarantee. The bank also had no duty to advise Mrs Clarke of her husband's 
intention to give a guarantee or as to its effect. The Court felt the situation was governed by 
contract as Mrs Clarke had committed herself under the mortgage signed some 13 years 
earlier to meet any liability which Mr Clarke may subsequently incur under any guarantee. 
The Clarkes pleaded oppressive conduct pursuant to the Credit Contracts Act 1981, but the 
Court also considered the possibility of an undue influence claim. The latter was rejected on 
the grounds that a relationship between a banker and customer is not one which ordinarily 
gives rise to a presumption of undue influence and there was no actual undue influence in 
evidence. The Court did not address the possibility of Mrs Clarke being subjected to undue 
influence on the part of her husband, despite finding that throughout their married life she left 
all business, banking and financial matters to her husband and trusted him to deal with those 
matters on behalf of both of them - surely a classic O'Brien presumed undue influence 
situation . The Court also found that the Bank had breached the Code of the New Zealand 
21 Beck, A "Contract" [ 1997) NZ Law Review 1, 11 ["Contract 2 "] 
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Bankers' Association as they did not advise Mr Clarke to get independent advice because of 
the risk of the ultimate liability he was assuming, but that the code did not amount to 
"reasonable standards of commercial practice" and thus there was no breach of the Credit 
Contracts Act 1981. 
Paterson J. in coming to his conclusion on the bank's duties/obligations issue relied on a 
number of decisions to similar effect, all of which predated O'Brien. Neither Baxter nor 
0 'Brien were referred to at all by his Honour, yet it is submitted, with respect, that the 
situation in Clarke was very similar to that in Baxter in relation to subsequent advances using 
existing security. The fact that Mr Clarke was an experienced business person seemed to 
weigh heavily with the Court. However Mrs Clarke's position seems to have been somewhat 
glossed over. She relied on her husband in such matters, received no independent advice and 
did not know at all about the guarantee of her husband ' s business debts. His Honour's 
decision may well be commercially realistic, drawing on caveat emptor type reasoning but, 
with respect, it does seem inconsistent with decisions like Baxter and O'Brien. Furthermore, 
if the Code of Banking Practice does not amount to evidence of "reasonable standards of 
commercial practice", it is difficult to see what would. As di scussed in section VI below, the 
Banking Ombudsman scheme is an integral part of the Code of Banking Practice and the 
Ombudsman in making recommendations on complaints is directed to take note of any 
applicable rule of law, the general principles of good banking practice and any relevant code 
of practice. 
3. 'fl1e Court of Appeal 's contribution 
Once a lender knows, for example, that a guarantor has limited commercial ability, is on the 
point of entering a transaction that is financially disadvantageous from his or her point of 
view and that the guarantor is dependent on the advice of the principal debtor, what should 
the bank do to ensure the efficacy of its guarantee and thus avoid the effect of the 
presumption of undue influence or misrepresentation, or the Credit Contracts Act? 
In Wilkinson v. ASB Bank Ltd (1998) 6 NZBLC 102,427 the Court of Appeal developed a 
series of guidelines for such situations. The Court of Appeal ' s advice is as follows:
23 
22 "Contract] " Above n17,3 1 
23 Wilkin son , above n I , 102,440-102,442. As summarised in Max ton, J.K. "Equity" [ 1998] I NZ Law 
Review 37, 42-43 ["Equity" ] 
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I .To allay the suspicion of undue influence the bank should insist that the guarantor be given 
advice by an independent solicitor, obtaining a certificate that the effect & implications of the 
documents have been explained and appear to have been understood. 
2.If a guarantor declines to obtain independent advice the bank should record the refusal m 
writing and have it signed and secondly ensure that a solicitor explains the documents and 
their consequences to the guarantor. 
3.The solicitor engaged should raise with the guarantor issues of the principal debtor's 
creditworthiness and the guarantor's potential financial exposure. 
4.It is prudent for a bank to insist that the guarantor is advised by a solicitor who is not acting 
for another party to the transaction. But, if a reasonable person, with the knowledge of the 
bank would believe that the solicitor's independence has been compromised or if the bank 
knew or had good reason to believe that the solicitor was unaware of crucial facts, known to 
the bank, about the transaction and the risk to which the guarantor was being exposed, the 
bank may not be able to rely on a solicitor's certificate. 
5.Finally, there may be cases where the substance of the transaction or a term of the 
guarantee or security is so disadvantageous that no solicitor could properly advise the 
guarantor to sign. The bank, at the very least, should seek a certificate from the independent 
solicitor which states that this particular matter has been pointed out to the guarantor. 
The Court had to decide whether a mortgage and guarantee given by Mrs Wilkinson, a 
woman of 70, for her husband's business purposes was enforceable by the ASB. A number 
of matters (including her age, the lack of financial advantage to her from the transaction, the 
fact that the loan offers were not accepted by her but by others on her behalf and the 
suggestion that the documents be signed under power of attorney) indicated the possibility 
that undue influence had been practiced on Mrs Wilkinson by her husband. The question 
was whether the Bank's right to recover the debt and enforce the security was affected by 
constructive notice of these circumstances. 
The Court of Appeal held that the Bank had taken sufficient steps and that, therefore, it's 
rights were unaffected. The ASB had insisted throughout that independent advice be given to 
Mrs Wilkinson. Although the ASB knew that the solicitor who advised Mrs Wilkinson had 
been the family solicitor previously, the Court rejected an argument that that compromised his 
independence. It was not to be assumed that because a solicitor had some involvement with 
12 
the principal debtor, he or she wac; unable to function independently m advising a 
guarantor. 24 
Wilkinson is a decision that is important for both bankers and solicitors. To an extent not 
matched in other decisions it attempts to give practical guidance to financiers and their legal 
ad visors in the execution of guarantees.25 
The advice of the Court of Appeal in Wilkinson should be the benchmark to judge cases 
within the factual matrix of this subsection, like Clarke. On such an analysis, again Clarke 
falls down. Principally because of the holding that the bank did not have to advise Mrs 
Clarke of the existence and effect of the subsequent extension of credit under the matrimonial 
home security or of the necessity to obtain independent advice. 
4. Silence and oppression 
The most interesting and contentious recent decision in this area was that delivered by 
Hammond J. in Prudential Building and Investment Soc. of Canterbury v. Hankins [1997] 1 
NZLR 114. The High Court was asked to find that silence by a financier in the face of an 
(arguably manufactured)26 mistake as to the nature of a loan was oppressive. In the course of 
his judgment, Hammond J. examined in some detail the concept of "oppression" under the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981. His Honour suggested that the current approach 1s 
unsatisfactory, and looked to United States and Canadian materials for guidance. 
The defendants were seeking to obtain for the development of a parcel of land, a loan of 
$ l .6m. However the financier (Action Finance, which had since sold the security to 
Prudential) was not prepared to advance more than $850,000 which it did. The advance was 
secured by a mortgage over a residence held by a family trust of which the first defendant 
was trustee. The defendants needed significantly more than the $850,000 to proceed with 
their development plan and appear, at least in their own minds, to have considered this 
advance as an interim measure until later advances were made and different security 
substituted. Action Finance though, considered the arrangement to be in accordance with the 
24 Wilkinson, above n I , 102,443 
25 Equity , above n23, 43 
26 Webb, D "When will silence be oppressive under the Credit Contracts Act?" (1997) 3 NZBLQ 154,154 
["silence"] 
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express terms of the contract, and complete. The defendants never met any of their 
obligations under the mortgage. 
$600,000 of the advance was for refinancing, involving the exchange of a cheque for that 
sum to be used to satisfy earlier advances and consolidate the borrowings. In returning the 
cheque to Action Finance the solicitor for the defendants noted, in a letter and in the 
endorsement on the cheque itself, that the cheque was payment in temporary settlement. The 
letter also noted that the settlement was only an interim measure until an advance of $ l .6m 
was made and a replacement mortgage over a separate property executed. It was these 
statements which were central to the claim of oppression. 
It was found as a matter of fact and law that the transaction was not an interim measure, but a 
final one. The statements by the defendants were seen by Action Finance as an attempt to 
vary unilaterally the terms of the mortgage, and impose on Action a duty to advance a further 
$800,000 which had not been agreed to. The (understandable) response to this was to ignore 
the statements and treat the relationship in accordance with the original contractual basis. 
Hammond J. found that the lender, by remaining silent in the face of an attempt on the part of 
the borrower to alter the terms of the executed loan arrangements ( or misunderstanding the 
nature of the transaction) had acted oppressively. 
His Honour recognised, but did not adopt,27 the suggestion that there was a single unifying 
principle in the concept of oppression: that of "abuse of relationship" between the parties. 28 
"The cases also evidence a disinclination on the part of our Courts to proceed on anything 
other than a case-by-case basis". 29 Although his Honour noted some "useful sub-principles" 
that have evolved.30 
His Honour then focused on "unconscionable", the limb of the definition of oppression relied 
on by the defendants. He drew a distinction between procedural unconscionability - the 
manner in which the contract was entered into or the exercise of powers under the contract; 
27 Hankins, above n7, 124 
28 Anderson v. Burbe0• Finance Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 20, 27. His Honour also cited Pol, R "Credit Contracts: 
The Factors Going to Oppression" (1989) 6 AULR 139. 
29 Hankins, above n7, 123 
30 Hankins, above n7, 123. See discussion at below n82 - Section Y.A.I. See also Gault on Commercial 
Law (Brooker' s, Wellington, 1994) vol 2, Credit Contracts Act, paras. 11.06-11.27, which identifies 21 
matters derived from a consideration of the cases, which may bear on whether conduct is oppressive. 
Hammond J. also reproduces a list of considerations produced by the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its 
1987 Report on the Amendment of the Law of Contract in the context of unconscionability. 
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and substantive unconscionability - the benefits, risks and burdens of the contract itself. His 
Honour also suggested a third class of unconscionability: that which occurs in enforcement or 
collection,31 although, with respect, this seems to be merely a subset of procedural 
unconscionability. 
Hammond J. suggested that section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which creates 
a statutory doctrine of unconscionability, and the jurisprudence which has arisen from that 
section, were of relevance. Williams v. Walker Thomas Funiiture Co. 350 F 2d 455, 499 
(1965) (DC Cir). was cited by Hammond J. The case stated that there must be both an 
"absence of meaningful choice" (that is, procedural unfairness) and contract terms which are 
unreasonably favourable to one party (that is, substantive unfairness). However Hammond 
J. went on to find a complete absence of substantive unconscionability. The arrangements 
were not unfair, nor did they allocate benefits in anything other than a commercially 
reasonable manner. His Honour effectively decided that procedural unfairness alone was 
sufficient to found an action for oppression, contrary to the US position. 
Hammond J. after his theoretical discussion, does not seem to adopt any particular approach 
in coming to his conclusion and his decision has thus been criticised. Notwithstanding the 
finding that the true state of affairs was clearly expressed by the words of the contract the 
Court imposed a duty to respond to the defendants apparent misapprehension; " ... [I]t seems 
axiomatic to me that a lender is under an obligation to ensure the clarity of a transaction."32 
Webb states:33 
It seems difficult to justify a finding that the lender is ultimately responsible for a 
misapprehension created by the inattention, or possibly contrivance, of the other party, simply 
because it does not reiterate the clear contractual position. 
Both parties were experienced in business and used to arranging complex finance deals, there 
was thus no inequality of bargaining power; the contract contained no unreasonable or 
unexpected terms; the borrower was not 'ambushed'; the lender did not act in a way to 
mislead the borrower; the borrower was independently advised; and it had previously been 
made clear that the amount of funds sought would not be made available. One commercial 
31 Hankin s, above n7 ,125 
3
" Hankins, above n7,127 
33 silence , above n26 , 157 
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party, at the most convenient moment, fancied a term to exist which simply did not. The 
failure of the lender to dispel this illusion was found to be oppressive. 
C. English cases 
In Barclays Bank pie v. Thomson [ 1997] 4 All ER 816 the wife owned the family home and 
mortgaged it to the bank to secure an overdraft for her husband's business. The bank 
engaged the husband's solicitors to act on its behalf in obtaining her signature. They certified 
that they had explained to her the full content of the charge and that she was aware of what 
she had signed. They had not, however, pointed out to her that the charge was unlimited. 
Simon Brown L.J. could see no good reason whatever why a bank, perhaps conscientiously 
instructing solicitors to give independent advice to a signatory who might otherwise go 
unadvised, should thereby be disabled from relying on the solicitors' certificate that such 
advice has been properly given. 
Barclays Bank pie v. Boulter [ 1997] 2 All ER 1002 confirms that once a guarantor alleges 
undue influence or misrepresentation it is for the bank to plead and prove that it did not have 
constructive notice thereof, not on the guarantor to prove that it did. 
Royal Bank of Scotland pie v. Etridge [ 1997] 3 All ER 628 involved a charge given by a wife 
over her house, the family home, to support her husband's business overdraft. The charge 
was signed in the presence of a solicitor whom the bank had appointed to act on its behalf. It 
seems that he also acted for the husband. The case seems indistinguishable from Thomson 
however the Court of Appeal held that the fact that the bank had instructed the solicitor 
constituted him "their own solicitor for the purposes of giving the appropriate information or 
advice to the bank". Therefore awareness of insufficient advice would be imputed to the 
bank. Such an approach was described as wholly artificial in Thomson and Blanchard J. in 
Wilkinson stated that "Etridge seems to be a departure from the position taken in other 
cases"34 and went on to essentially adopt the Thomson approach. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 was viewed by the 
judges of the Court of Appeal as the clearest possible case for relief on O'Brien. However:(i) 
the relationship between the surety and principal debtor, of employee and employer, clearly 
falls outside the "emotional and sexual nature" type referred to in O'Brien as giving rise to 
34 Wilkinson, above nl, 102,437 
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presumed undue influence; (ii) the Bank twice wrote to the proposed surety advising of the 
unlimited nature of the charge and of the desirability of obtaining independent advice; and (iii) 
the Court suggested that the nature and extent of the disadvantage in the transaction to the· 
surety may be so severe that the lender must insist on independent advice and must 
reasonably believe that the advice was obtained, was competent and even that it was 
followed. 
Miss Burch was an 18 year old employee of a company controlled by a Mr Pelosi. She 
agreed to execute a charge over her flat to assist the company's application for an increase in 
its overdraft. Burch discussed the solicitors letters to her (advising of the unlimited nature of 
the mortgage and advising her to seek independent advice) with Pelosi and he either prepared 
her reply or told her what she should say. Burch was unaware of the extent of the 
company's indebtedness and did not obtain independent advice. 
The result, with respect, seems difficult to justify along the lines of O'Brien. Chen-Wishart 
argues that the case exposes O'Brien as rooted in, and merely one application of, relief 
against unconscionable transactions and it is in that wider context that Burch can, and should, 
be understood. Secondly she argues that the case reveals the potency of serious substantive 
unfairness in triggering relief under the O'Brien principle. 35 Chen-Wishart contends that it 
was substantive unfairness which gave rise to the inferences that the procedural pre-
conditions of relief existed in this case. A jurisdiction explained in terms of vitiated consent 
or unconscientious conduct is hard pushed to explain why a complainant, not under a legally 
recognised incapacity, who chooses not to obtain advice or to act against advice when such 
advice is recommended by the creditor, should be relieved from a "bad bargain". However, 
if the Court had openly admitted to some concern to prevent substantive unfairness, then the 
result is much easier to understand.36 Chen-Wishart points out that the accepted wisdom that 
procedural unfairness is the only legitimate juridical basis of relief in consensual dealings 
needs challenging and that it is in fact often substantive unfairness underlying decisions 
cloaked in the language of procedural unconscionability.37 The courts need to inject 
transparency into their decisions. If they are prepared to grant relief on the basis of 
substantive unfairness this should be stated in a court's reasoning. Otherwise, if there is no 
procedural unconscionability then the court should refuse to grant relief from the 
35 Chen-Wishart, M 'The O'Brien principle and substantive unfairness" ( 1997) 56 CU 60, 60 [ "substantive 
unfaimess"] 
36 substantive unfairness, above n35, 70 
37 substantive unfairness, above n35, 60 
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consequences of a "bad bargain". Legal rhetoric one way, when the reality is often the other, 
does nothing for legal certainty. 
David Capper38 agrees that it is stretching the "relationship of trust and confidence" somewhat 
to fit an employer-employee relationship into it, and it is also difficult to see why the bank's 
letter to the defendant pointing out the unlimited nature of the transaction and the desirability 
of obtaining independent advice did not constitute sufficient steps on its part to rid itself of the 
consequences of any constructive notice. 
What really caused the Court of Appeal to set this mortgage aside was its utter substantive 
unfairness and the better judicial basis for the decision is the unconscionable conduct of the 
bank in taking a security so thoroughly unbalanced. 39 
Capper cites the case in illustration of "some of the major doctrinal problems associated with 
undue influence and unconscionability"40 to support his contention (examined more fully 
below) that the doctrine of undue influence may be usefully subsumed into an enlarged 
conception of unconscionability. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wilkinson considered all four of the above cases 
(notably all of English Court of Appeal authority) in coming to their decision and formulating 
their guidelines referred to above. The English authorities appear to be following O'Brien 
considerably closer than some of the New Zealand authorities which the author has 
considered above. The case of Burch though, forces a reconsideration of the accepted 
wisdom with respect to the procedural/substantive unfairness distinction and also with respect 
to the true basis for the decision in O'Brien. Although claiming to be following O'Brien, the 
court appears to have significantly extended available relief. If understood as substantive 
unfairness and unconscionability, the decision is more readily acceptable. 
Unfortunately the English jurisprudence suffers from inconsistency also - just as Baxter and 
Clarke are inconsistent in New Zealand, Thomson and Etridge come to different conclusions 
in England. In fact Etridge appears to be a departure from the position taken in other cases 
38 Capper, D "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 479 
["Rationalisation"] 
39 Rationalisation, above n38, 502 
40 Rationalisation, above n38, 503 
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also.41 What is notable is the commonality in the type of fact situation that the courts are 
addressing in this area, between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In both jurisdictions 
the courts are dominated by 'all obligations' securities executed essentially for the benefit of a 
spouse's (or in the case of Burch an employer's) business purposes. 
D. Australian cases 
Patrick Lowden and Justyn Walsh argue the recent decision of the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal in Elders Rural Finance Ltd v. Smith (1996)[ 1997] ASC 56-366 may have 
significant implications for lenders.42 The Smiths conducted a farming and grazing business 
on a property known as 'Roseleigh'. In mid-1985 they approached Elders for financing of 
the acquisition of a property. Elders agreed, but the proposal was then abandoned. A short 
time later, Elders alerted the Smiths to a property called 'Nuneham Park' which had come 
onto the market. After Elders had prepared detailed 10-year cash flow projections as to the 
grazing operation on the properties, they agreed to lend the Smiths $973,000. The loan was 
secured by mortgages over Nuneham Park, Roseleigh and other properties. The Smiths were 
not trained in accounting, commerce or law and did not review the projections. However, 
they did know the quality of land, the value of it, and what return to expect from it. 
The investment was a disaster. The Smiths were not even able to maintain interest payments 
on the property, and Elders sued to recover the loan. The Smiths claimed relief under the 
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) on the basis that the loan contract was "unjust". This is 
defined in section 4 of the Act as including "unconscionable, harsh or oppressive", all three 
terms appear in the definition of "oppressive" under section 9 of New Zealand's Credit 
Contracts Act 1981. Therefore the decision is highly relevant. 
At first instance, Bryson J found that: 43 
• the Smiths were not deprived of any real or informed choice about the nature of the 
documents they entered into; 
41 Banchard J. in Wilkinson, above n 1, 102,437, refers to two - National Westminster Bank pie v Beaton 
(unreported, 14 April 1997) and Midland Bank pie v Serter [1995] 1 FLR 1034. 
42 Lowden, P & Walsh, J "Am I my brother's keeper?" Journal of Banking & Finance Law and Practice 8(2) 
June 1997 138 
43 (1995) 35 NSWLR 395 
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• there was nothing unjust, unreasonable, or unusual in any of the terms of the loan or 
security documents; 
• there was nothing unfair in the benefits Elders derived from the transaction; 
• the Smiths were not overborne, pushed or cajoled into the transaction by Elders; 
• Elders did not act unfairly or otherwise than in good faith; and 
• Elders had no duty to advise or give any explanation of the transaction to the Smiths. 
However, Bryson J also found that: 
• Elders knew the Smiths were financially unsophisticated and relied on professional advice 
and assistance in deciding what to do; 
• Elders' projections "would be realised only in an extraordinary combination of favourable 
circumstances which did not happen and was not realistically likely to happen, still Jess to 
continue for years". 
• Elders agreed to make available the loan only because its position was protected by 
security and further Elders did not communicate this to the Smiths, who viewed the 
approval of their loan as a "vote of confidence" in the proposal. 
• Whilst Elders were protected if the project failed, the Smiths were not and would have 
been "destroyed". 
Bryson J. went on to find that the contract was "unjust" for the purposes of the Contracts 
Review Act. 
The Court of Appeal upheld Bryson J' s judgment by a 2 to 1 majority. The unprincipled, 
highly discretionary nature of the inquiry is shown by Mahoney P' s comment that: "In the 
end, the meaning of injustice lies in the reaction of the individual judge, informed by what 
has been said to those to whom he ought to have regard" 44 
His Honour found that in his opinion the contract would not have been set aside by a court of 
equity as sufficiently harsh, oppressive or unconscionable, but that the Act was intended to 
set a less onerous standard. The majority's decision was based on the fact that Elders knew 
or ought to have known that the transaction was likely to be a disaster from the Smiths' 
perspective (the inaccuracy of the projections prepared by Elders weighed heavily with the 
44 (1996) [1997) ASC 56-366, 57,237 ["Elders"] 
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Cour1), knew the Smiths' had little capacity to realise this (although it was also found that the 
Smiths had enough experience and ability to make an assessment of the worth and carrying 
capacity of the property), and chose to proceed because its own position was protected by 
security. 
Mahoney P. stated (contrary to Bryson J.) Elders were under a duty, not legal but in justice, 
to ensure that the Smiths appreciated the extent and likelihood of the burdens that might fall 
upon them. Importantly, Handley J.A. found that the distinction drawn in previous cases 
between the transaction or investment on the one hand, and the contract on the other, was not 
applicable here as Elders was more than a mere financier - they prepared the projections. 
This blurring of the distinction was disapproved of by Meagher I.A. in his dissenting 
opinion. His Honour stated that Bryson J. had granted relief because Elders were, through 
their commercial experience, of greater ability to foresee impending disaster, although there 
was nothing in the slightest degree unjust in the contract or in the manner in which it was 
reached. . To do this was, according to his Honour, to penalise a transaction rather than 
reform an unjust contract and that was an error in law. 
It is this author's opinion that Meagher J.A.'s dissent is to be preferred. The case makes it 
clear that the fact that the terms of a loan may be fair, reasonable and fully understood by the 
borrower and that the borrower may have entered into the loan without any pressure from the 
lender or any third party does not make the loan immune from the Contracts Review Act. 
This places unrealistic obligations on lenders and makes their position very uncertain. 
Lenders now have a duty to ensure that financially unsophisticated borrowers appreciate the 
extent and likelihood of the burdens that might fall upon them. Essentially lenders have to 
advise as to the prudence of the intended transaction. Surely this can not be the function of 
law - protecting people from the consequences of a bad deal freely entered into, at the 
expense of an "innocent" lender. 
E. Cases uz summary 
Whilst Taylor illustrated the reluctance of courts to interfere and second-guess a business' 
commercial decisions, Hankins imposed a duty on the lender to respond to the defendant's 
(arguably contrived) misapprehension about the clear words of the contract, or attempt to 
vary the terms and the failure to do this amounted to oppression, notwithstanding a complete 
lack of substantive unfairness in the bargain. 
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Baxter and Clarke - decisions 2 months apart with very similar facts - came to opposite 
conclusions, as did the two U.K. decisions of Thomson and Etridge. While O'Brien is said 
by most courts to be the leading decision in the area of bank's responsibilities in an undue 
influence situation, neither Dungey nor Clarke referred to the case in factual situations within 
the ambit of O'Brien. Yet in Burch the court gave relief under O'Brien when there was no 
relationship that could give rise to a presumption of undue influence nor any other procedural 
unconscionability. 
Perhaps the best recent New Zealand decision in the area, was that of the Court of Appeal in 
Wilkinson. Not only does it lay down guidelines for lenders it also does not place an 
unrealistic obligation on them by holding that ASB had taken sufficient steps to rebut 
constructive notice of undue influence in insisting on independent advice, notwithstanding the 
solicitor was the family solicitor who advised the husband on his business dealings . The 
case has now set the benchmark from which other cases should be judged. 
Elders also imposes unrealistic obligations on lenders by imposing a duty to ensure that 
financially unsophisticated borrowers appreciate the extent and likelihood of the burdens that 
might fall upon them, and it would seem, advise them against risky deals like that in the case. 
The fact that all the terms were fair, reasonable and fully understood by the borrowers who 
freely entered into the loan was not enough in the end to a majority who blurred the 
distinction between the contract itself and the wider transaction or investment to which the 
contract relates. Importantly the decision has relevance for New Zealand under the Credit 
Contract Act as the definition of "unjust" - the accepted pleading in the case - includes 
"unconscionable, harsh or oppressive". All three terms appear in the definition of 
"oppressive" under section 9 of the New Zealand legislation. 
At the end of an analysis of recent case law, the scope of "oppression" under the Act remains 
unclear. How consistent is it with the common law of unfair contracts or the Fair Trading 
Act? In Baxter the Court was prepared to grant relief under all three heads, that is under the 
common law, the Credit Contracts Act and section 9 of the Fair Trading Act. Clarke similarly 
came to the same conclusion on all three with Paterson J. emphasising consistency with his 
conclusions on equitable grounds . Dungey however found a breach of the Fair Trading Act 
and the Code of Banking Practice yet refused to grant relief under the common law or the 
Credit Contracts Act. Hammond J. in Hankins although focu sing on the "unconscionability" 
part of the definition of oppressive granted relief in circumstances where it is doubtful the 
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equitable doctrine of unconscionability at common law would have. However it is equally 
doubtful whether there was oppression in terms of the Act in this case. It is submitted that 
the courts have generally sought consistency with principles of the courts of equity in 
interpreting "oppressive" under the Act such that it is similar to unconscionability in the wider 
sense (including undue influence). Where the common law and the Act as interpreted 
diverge, the author contends the decision may well be open to question. 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS - IN SEARCH OF INCREASED 
CERTAINTY 
With recent case law giving rise to such uncertainty and a lack of sound doctrinal basis for 
decisions, the question is begged - what can the law do about the problem? 
A. Common law 
There has been a good deal of recent literature45 inquiring into the possibility of merging the 
two doctrines of undue influence and unconscionability. Professor Birks and Professor 
Chin46 argue that the two doctrines are fundamentally distinct, undue influence being 
"plaintiff-sided" and concerned with the weakness of the plaintiff's consent owing to 
excessive dependence upon the defendant, and unconsionability being "defendant-sided" and 
concerned with the defendant's exploitation of the plaintiff's vulnerability. Although they 
accept the two doctrines may be able to do about 95% of the work of each other they come 
out against merger as "developed law must accept analytical distinctions."47 
David Capper in a July 1998 piece48 contends that his views depart little form those of Birks 
and Chin as to the nature of undue influence, but he maintains that unconscionability is not 
fundamentally different from it and thus the two doctrines can and might be profitably merged 
into a wider understanding of unconsionability. 
45 See also Thompson [1994] Conv. 233 and Phang "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages" 
[1995] J.B.L. 552 
46 Birks, P; Chin, N.Y. "On the Nature of Undue Influence" in Beatson and Friedmann (ed.), Good Faith and 
Fault in Contract Law (1995) [ "Birks and Chin"] 
47 Birks and Chin, above n46, 73 and 95 
48 Rationalisation, above n38 
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VICTORIA UNIVEFWITY OF WELLINGTON 
He submits that in application of this new doctrine, the court would have to weigh up the 
three key elements common to both undue influence and unconscionability of relational 
inequality, transactional imbalance (which would serve only an evidentiary function, ie. a 
strong case of transactional imbalance would strengthen a case for relief based primarily on 
one of the other two elements) and unconscionable conduct; and come to an overall judgment 
as to whether a particular transaction can stand. 
As referred to above, Capper cites Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Burch as an 
illustration of the courts manipulating the two existing doctrines to ensure that someone who 
"should" win, does so: "Where this occurs it blurs the distinction between the two doctrines 
at the expense of that legal certainty which they are intended to maintain."49 
This writer finds Capper's rationalisation argument highly persuasive. In New Zealand the 
problem is further exacerbated by the existence of a third alternative for relief ( or a third way 
of having transactions usurped) in section 10 of the Credit Contracts Act. The author submits 
that it would be profitable to also subsume this within a general doctrine, applicable to all 
transactions, not merely 'credit contracts'. The following concluding remarks of Capper, it is 
submitted, would apply equally (or perhaps more so given the problems of the Act) to this 
suggested three way rationalisation:50 
[A] general doctrine might advance legal certainty, because it would not obscure the underlying 
policy considerations, which tend to get buried when differences are maintained between what 
is essentially the same. Cases might be better argued because litigants and their advisors 
would better understand what issues around which evidence and argument had to be organised. 
Parties with abundant resources would not be able to prolong litigation to the prejudice of less 
well resourced parties by taking obscure and unmeritorious points . And in the long term 
courts might find it easier to develop clear and rational criteria for the resolution of these 
disputes 
49 Rationalisation, above n38, 501 
50 Rationalisation, above n38 , 503 
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B. Legislation 
In September 1990 the Law Commission published a discussion paper on "Unfair" 
Contracts. 51 The paper sets out a possible legislative scheme to regulate unfair contracts, 
unfair contractual terms and the unfair exercise of contractual rights. At the time the paper 
was roundly criticised by those in the legal profession as likely to significantly increase 
uncertainty in the law of contract.52 I consider it here, in 1998, as an example of a statutory 
rationalisation of "unfair" contracts as: 53 
The scheme is intended to operate as a code as far as it extends .. .It is meant to subsume all 
these doctrines [unconscionable contracts, duress, undue influence, estoppel, 
breach of fiduciary duty (and presumably the Credit Contract Act)] as far as they 
make contracts invalid or unenforceable or enable them to be reopened. 
The fundamental objective of the scheme is "to achieve a better and clearer balance between 
the legitimate desire for contractual freedom and certainty, and the equally legitimate need to 
avoid injustices flowing from the misuse of a superior bargaining position. "54 
The reasons given for parliamentary intervention are, at best, questionable. First, it is 
suggested that it may be better to have a general statute than the present multiplication of 
specific statutory provisions regulating particular types of contract. 55 McLauchlan responds: 
"Of course, the disadvantage of such legislation is that it will inadvertently cast the net too 
wide or render relatively unexceptionable contractual practices subject to challenge. "56 
Ironically, given the scheme's criticism, the next main reason given for intervention is that 
there is "a degree of uncertainty" in the common law. The Commission attempts to define 
unfair contracts in an endeavour to avoid there being an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in 
the law in clauses 2-4: 
51 Unfair Contracts Preliminary Paper No 11 , Law Commission, 1990 [ "Discussion paper"] 
52 See particularly McLauchlan, D.W. "Unfair Contracts -The Law Commission 's Draft Scheme" [1991) NZ 
Ree LR 311 ["Draft Scheme'1 
53 Discussion paper, above n5 l, para 133 
54 Discussion paper, above n5 l, para 91 
55 The Consumers Institute makes the same argument with respect to consumer credit law - Chattels Transfer 
Act, Credit Contracts Act, Hire Purchase Act, Credit (Repossession) Act 
56 Draft Scheme, above n52 , 314 
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2. General test of unfairness 
A contract, or a term of a contract, may be unfair if a party to that contract is seriously disadvantaged in 
relation to another party to the contract because he or she: 
(a) is unable to appreciate adequately the provisions or the implications of the contract by reason of age, 
sickness, mental, educational or linguistic disability, emotional distress, or ignorance of business affairs; or 
(b) is in need of the benefits for which he or she has contracted to such a degree as to have no real choice 
whether or not to enter into the contract; or 
(c) is legally or in fact dependent upon, or subject to the influence of, the other party or persons 
connected with the other party in deciding whether to enter into the contract; or 
(d) reasonably relies on the skill , care or advice of the other party or a person connected with the other 
party in entering into the contract; or 
(e) has been induce to enter into the contract by oppressive means, including threats, harassment or 
improper pressure; or 
(f) is for any other reason in the opinion of the court at a serious disadvantage; 
and that other party knows or ought to know of the facts constituting that disadvantage, or of facts from which 
that disadvantage can reasonably be inferred. 
3. Professional Advice 
In considering whether a contract, or a term of a contract, is unfair the court shall have regard, among other 
things, to whether the disadvantaged party received appropriate legal or other professional advice. 
4. Result must be unfair 
(1) Notwithstanding clause 2, a contract is not unfair unless in the context of the contract as a whole: 
(a) it results in a substantially unequal exchange of values ; or 
(b) the benefits received by a disadvantaged party are manifestly inappropriate to his or her 
circumstances; or 
(c) the disadvantaged party was in a fiduciary relationship with the other party. 
(2) A grossly unequal exchange of values may create a presumption that the contract is unfair. 
But for McLauchlan; "these provisions are at once too wide and too narrow. On a plain 
reading they catch contracts which were probably not intended to be caught and they exclude 
contracts in respect of which relief is available at common law"57 and further "attempting to 
57 Draft Scheme, above n52 , 315 
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'pin down the elements of unconsionability to avoid unnecessary uncertainty'l5Rl is a futile 
exercise. "59 
McLauchlan gives an example of a single and relatively low income family signing up for an 
expensive medical insurance scheme.60 The requisite disadvantage is established through 
reasonable reliance (clause 2(d)). Even if the insurance scheme has good benefits worth the 
money being paid (so that there is no substantially unequal exchange of values), it may be 
strongly arguable in terms of clause 4(1 )(b) that those benefits are "manifestly inappropriate" 
to the circumstances of the family. 
On the other side of the coin, McLauchJan uses Nichols v Jessup. 61 The defendant, Mrs 
Jessup, owned a property with a full frontage to the road. The plaintiff, a manager of a real 
estate company, owned a large rear section with a large rear section with a rather narrow 
access from the road. The parties entered into a contract which provided for the 
amalgamation of the plaintiffs access and the defendant's driveway. If carried out, this 
arrangement would have substantially improved the potential for development of the 
plaintiff's land. However, the defendant later changed her mind and refused to go ahead. 
The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enforce the agreement as it was set aside on the ground 
that it was unconscionable. McLauchJan then varies the facts: The contract provides for 
payment to the defendant of a sum which would compensate her for the diminution in value 
of her land and pay her a significant proportion of the plaintiff's profit on the deal. Secondly, 
the plaintiff set out to exploit his superior bargaining position by applying persistent, albeit 
subtle pressure over a period of time causing the defendant to sign a contract which she flatly 
refused to sign at the outset. Thus there was an element of overreaching or active 
victimisation on the plaintiffs part. The contract would almost undoubtedly be set aside on 
the grounds of unconscionability. Yet there would appear to be no jurisdiction to grant relief 
under the draft scheme because the requirements of clause 4 are not satisfied. There is no 
substantial inequality in the exchange, the benefits received by the defendant are not 
"manifestly inappropriate", nor are the parties in a fiduciary relationship. 62 
For McLauchlan, the only reason given by the Commission which has substantial merit is 
that "[l]egislation could promote access to and use of the law on a subject of considerable 
58 Discussion paper, above n51, para 94 
59 Draft Scheme, above n52, 334 
60 Draft Scheme, above n52, 321 
61 
[ 1986] 1 NZLR 226 
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public importance and interest."63 Legislation can also serve an educational function in 
providing an easier vehicle for publicity purposes than common law dicta. However this 
reason may only assist the case for legislation dealing with consumer contracts as opposed to 
legislation on unfair contracts as a whole. This comment may also be made about another 
reason put forward by the Commission - assisting in the provision of "practical access to 
justice"64 via the provision of some machinery for public action. Clause 11 of the draft 
scheme gives standing to the Commerce Commission to apply on behalf of an aggrieved 
consumer or consumer group. 
Notably the Consumers Institute released a report on the "Reform of Consumer Credit Law in 
New Zealand" in August of 1998 which also advocated statutory rationalisation but for 
consumer credit law. Both the Consumers Institute and the report of the Contracts and 
Commercial Law Reform Committee (on which the Credit Contracts Act was based) advocate 
a government enforcement agency to assist the consumer is obtaining practical access to 
justice. 
The Law Commission in 1990 clearly believed that the current law was not working. This 
writer believes it still isn't and furthermore it is producing highly questionable decisions like 
that in Hankins. The major problem with statutory intervention in unfair contracts is that it is 
extremely difficult to codify in statutory language the notion of unconscionability or 
unfairness without in fact reducing certainty and predictability. Lord Scarman put in thus: 
"Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not 
unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the particular facts of the case."65 
Cold comfort for those subject to the vagaries of the law, but perhaps this is the best we can 
do. Although the Law Commission's draft scheme was a laudable attempt at rationalisation, 
it seems doing this by legislation merely exacerbates the uncertainty which it aims to reduce. 
This author favours common law rationalisation in the hope that we can improve, albeit 
slightly, on Lord Scarman's case by case answer. A clearer doctrinal basis for 
unconscionability may help development of useful guidelines and general principles which in 
tum may reduce uncertainty. 
62 Draft Scheme, above n52, 323-324 
63 Discussion paper, above n51, para 77(5) 
64 Discussion paper, above n51, para 77(8) 
65 National Westminster Bank Pie v. Morgan [ 1985] AC 686, 709 
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V. THE CREDIT CONTRACTS ACT - A WAY FORWARD? 
A. The oppression provisions 
There is a Jack of cohesion in the current approaches of the courts to oppression. Hammond 
J. in Hankins rightly considered the existing Jaw on oppression inadequate. However, 
unfortunately, his Honour's decision, far from providing the foundation of a framework to 
replace the current Jaw, merely adds to the confusion and goes too far in protecting 
borrowers, leaving lenders in a state of uncertainty. This is somewhat ironic given His 
Honours observation that: "The cases evidence real caution against upsetting commercial 
bargains"66 • 
In the report which Jed to the implementation of the Act the Jaw reform committee went to 
some lengths to formulate meaningful guidelines for the courts to take into account m 
approaching the oppression question. The committee said that "the development of 
guidelines through the cases leaves too much to chance."67 However some of the guidelines 
were not included in the Bill when it was introduced to the House three and a half years later 
and the rest were scrapped in the course of the legislative process. The few factors which 
remain were described by one of the members of the Jaw reform committee itself - some "do 
no more than state the obvious and the remainder. .. are too wishy-washy to be of any 
practical utility ."68 
The definition of oppression in the Act has been criticised as vague and tautological. 69 The 
fact that the words in section 9 were intended to give a licence to the judges to apply their 
own standards of what was acceptable conduct is apparent from the words of the then 
Minister of Justice, Hon. J. McLay, MP, in debate in the House: 70 
The short answer is that, in the absence of any express definition of the words "oppressive", 
"harsh", "unjustly burdensome", "unconscionable", or "in contravention of acceptable standards 
66 Hankins, above n7, 123 
67 Report, above n2, para. 7 .21 
68 Dugdale, The Credit Contracts Act 1981 (Butterworths, 1981) 29. Cited in McLauchlan, D.W. "Contract 
and Commercial Law Reform in New Zealand" (1984) 11 NZULR 36, 48 ["McLauchlan"] 
69 Hon. R.J. Tizard, MP (25 September 1980) 433 NZPD 3690. 
70 Hon . J.K. McLay, MP (25 September 1980) 433 NZPD 3693. 
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of fair dealing", the court is obliged and expected to apply the ordinary common-sense meaning 
of those words to a particular transaction or a particular case. 
Dugan, in analysing the Act from a U.S. lawyers perspective, and comparing it with the 
unconscionability doctrine generally recognised in U.S. law71 states:72 "The Credit Contracts 
Act does not make the judiciary's task an easy one" and concludes; "[t]he results of litigation 
will likely import considerable uncertainty into credit transactions and call for increased 
involvement by all segments of the legal community."73 
Allen is trenchant in his criticism, lambasting the Act as "law for the lawyers (made by 
lawyers)"74 and concluding:75 "[T]his Act is just another example of the legislatures 
paternalistic and patronising habit of protecting its citizens against all evils - real and 
imagined" 
Admittedly these comments now seem somewhat exaggerated. The Courts have generally 
taken a robust approach and take guidance from other doctrines and their own decisions. 76 
They have utilised the existing concepts of unconscionability as well as constructing some 
basic rules from the cases decided under the Act. In Italia Holdings (Properties) Ltd v. 
Lonsdale Holdings (Auckland) Ltd,77 one of the earliest cases to analyse the concept of 
oppression, Vautier J. emphasised the need for more than mere inequality of exchange 
between the parties. There must be some additional element of injustice, either in a 
substantive or procedural sense. His Honour there observed:78 
[I]t would be difficult to argue in my view that an applicant under the Credit Contracts Act 
could succeed in having a credit contract set aside by setting out facts which would have been 
71 Uniform Commercial Code, s.2-302 which reads : If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit 
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
72 Dugan, R. "The New Zealand Credit Contracts Act: A United States Lawyers perspective" (1984) 11 
NZULR 20, 34 ["Dugan"] 
73 Dugan, above n72, 35 
74 Frankenstein , above n4, 149 
75 Frankenstein, above n4, 150 
76 See Asher, R.J. "The Statutory Reforms of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee from a 
1988 Perspective" (1988) 13 NZULR 190, 193 
77 [1984] 2 NZLR 1 ["Italia Holdings "] 
78 Italia Holdings, above 1177, 15 
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insufficient to enable a person in an unequal bargaining situation to have a contract entered 
into by him set aside on equitable grounds. 
1. Judicial approaches 
There appear to be two mam ways m which the courts have approached the "oppression 
question. 79 The first sees oppression as being founded on one main principle, of which each 
decision is an example. Support for such an approach can be found in the dicta of Gallen J. 
in Anderson v Burbery Finance Ltd8° where he said; "It is the abuse of the relationship which 
is the foundation of re-opening."81 This approach was expressly not adopted by Hammond J. 
in Hankins and is arguably so vague as to be of little assistance in any event. Furthermore, 
any such overarching principle, to be sufficiently flexible, would be subject to numerous 
exceptions and qualificatons. Thus such an approach has not been widely adopted by the 
courts. 
The second is a more ad hoe approach in which each case is dealt with on its own facts and 
the court considers whether it is sufficiently similar to any previously decided case, from 
which "sub-principles" 82 are elicited, and if not, whether the circumstances of the case are 
such that relief ought to be granted in any event. 
Hammond J. in Hankins identifies the following "sub-principles": 
• mere disadvantageousness is insufficient,83 
• oppression must be that of the lender,84 
• the exercise of rights may become unreasonable in light of collateral undertakings ,85 
• an action can be oppressive, notwithstanding that it is contractua]]y permitted,86 
79 See the analysis of Webb, proposed decision making process, above n6 
80 (1986) 2 NZLR 20 ["Anderson "] 
81 Anderson , above n80, 27 
82 Hankins, Above n7 , 123-124 
83 Italia Holdings, above n77 
84 Burbery• Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd (In Receivership) v. Haira (2 1 April 1994) unreported , High 
Court, Rotorua Registry , CP 93/89, Barker J. 
85 Manion v. Marac Finance [1986) 2 NZLR 586 
86 Robinson v. United Building Society (7 May 1987) unreported, High Court, Dunedin Registry , CP 35/87, 
Tompkin s J. 
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• m alleged cases of unreasonable standards of commercial practice, there should be led 
evidence of the reasonable market practice sought to be relied on.87 
Any such list is clearly non-exhaustive, as Wallace J. stated, a court will "intervene in any 
case where there is a sufficiently serious element of unfairness."88 What exactly this means is 
problematic - What is "sufficiently serious" and indeed what is "unfair" often depends on an 
individuals moral values and philosophical starting-points. Under such an approach, 
contracting parties and litigants often cannot be entirely certain whether a contract will be 
upheld or re-opened by a court. Such uncertainty flows from a failure to enunciate principles 
at any general level that may be applied in all cases to the questions of whether the contract is 
oppressive. There is also a lack of transparency in the way a court approaches the question. 
Rarely, if ever, does the court acknowledge that the power to re-open is based on a duty of 
the court to impose its perception of community standards of acceptable conduct on the 
parties to the transaction. This Jack of transparency in a courts reasoning offers little 
guidance to outside observers seeking to alter their behaviour appropriately so as not to fall 
foul of the law. The courts under this approach look at cases as a collection of factors. Yet 
the relevance and weight to be attached to any particular factor may be significantly affected 
by the existence of some other state of affairs. Although courts likely take the latter approach 
in practice, they do not enunciate how in their judgments. 
2. A suggested altem.ative approach 
Duncan Webb sets out an alternative possible approach or framework within which such 
questions might be considered.89 He analyses the question in four stages. First, it can be 
determined whether the preconditions of unfairness exist by asking whether the complaint is 
of procedural or substantive unfairness, or both. Webb suggests that more than some 
procedural unfairness is necessary thus the distinction is pivotal. Further it is argued, the 
distinction serves the practical purpose of ensuring that the unfairness complained of is 
properly identified. 
Second, the effect of the unfairness can be analysed by categorising it as going to either 
i)consent ii)eguality of exchange iii)the nature of the relationship between the parties. This is 
said to provide a framework for decisions and reduce the uncertainty. If a complaint of 
87 Cambridge Clothing Co Ltd v. Simpson [ 1988] 2 NZLR 340 
88 Didsbu,y v. Zion Farms Ltd (1989) 1 NZ ConvC 190,229, 190,238. 
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unfairness does not go to establish some fact about one of the above three categories then "it 
is hard to see how it can bear any persuasive weight."90 
Third, one can identify several recurring factors which fall within each of the categories of 
unfairness. By loobng at the particular facts of the case, and comparing them to factors 
present in other cases, it is argued the judge will be able to achieve parity with other 
decisions. 
Finally, it can be determined whether the unfairness is of a sufficient degree for which relief 
ought to be available. This involves a value-judgment as to whether the conduct complained 
of is sufficiently objectionable to provide relief. 
Webb states that the above analysis: "has sought to establish that in mmng such decisions 
the court can do so in a reasoned and coherent way" and "The proposed process differs 
substantially from the current approaches of the courts."91 However, with respect, this author 
does not believe the suggested framework substantively increases the level of predictability 
and certainty in the decision mmng process. Nor do I believe that it differs substantially 
from the current approaches of the courts. It seems to this author to merely add additional 
labelling at different points and give the appearance of judges mmng decisions in a reasoned 
and coherent manner. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Burch92 shows that the procedural/substantive 
unfairness distinction does not accurately reflect judicial action. If the situation is manifestly 
substantively unfair, then procedural unfairness will be inferred. Secondly cases will not be 
easily compartmentalised into Webb's three categories, and further what one judge considers 
as going to the nature of the relationship another may consider as going to consent. Webb's 
third stage is exactly what judges do now under the ad hoe approach and is therefore subject 
to the same criticisms of uncertainty. Finally, determining whether the unfairness is of a 
sufficient degree for which relief ought to be available returns to the subjective view of the 
judge. 
89 proposed decision making process, above n6 , 394-421 
90 proposed decision making process, above n6, 412 
91 proposed decision making process, above n6, 421 
92 [1997] I All ER 144. ["Burch"] 
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However perhaps such labelling is useful in providing a little more transparency to the 
decision making process, encouraging judges to talk openly about the basis of their 
decisions. Furthermore such an approach does identify questions to which the court's mind 
ought to be turned in considering the matter and perhaps some consistency can be achieved 
by the "adoption of a common framework of analysis as opposed to illusory objectivity."93 
Unfortunately there are value judgments to differing degrees at all levels of the decision 
making process in this area. The concept of oppression under the Credit Contracts Act rests 
on a judgment of the courts as to whether the conduct complained of is unacceptable. That 
judgment is, in the end both uncertain and subjective and despite its laudable aims, no 
framework for analysis like the above will change this. 
3. Interest rate ceilings 
Ison in his book on "Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection"94 considers statutory 
unconscionability provisions as a protection for consumers. Ison prefers instead an interest 
rate ceiling. Firstly he argues the legal result should be, as far as possible, clear, predictable 
and certain, so that creditors and consumers alike will know where they stand. A rate ceiling 
it is claimed, provides that certainty whereas unconscionability provisions;95 "require an 
adjudication at the behest of someone who is usually ill equipped to undertake litigation" and 
"[b]ecause unconscionability prescibes no clear rule of illegality, these sections of the Act [a 
reference to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (U.K.)] give little guidance for out of court 
settlements". 
Secondly Ison argues that a rate ceiling can be used to define the perimeters of consumer 
credit: 96 
An unconscionability provision can never be used for this purpose, partly because of the rarity 
of its invocation, and partly because the criteria that the courts are required to use by these 
provisions relate to the fairness of the interest rate having regard to the ri sk involved, rather 
than to the propriety of the interest rate having regard to social policy or other objectives. 
93 proposed decision-making process, above n6, 421 
9~ Ison , T.G . Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection (London, Croom Helm, 1979) [ "Credit Marketing "] 
95 Credit Marketing , above n94 , 208-209 
96 Credit Marketing , above n94, 209 
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The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee recommended that any contract with 
a finance rate exceeding 48 percent per annum should be presumed to be harsh and 
unconscionable.97 But this recommendation was not adopted by Parliament. The Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs notes: "It is likely to be counter-productive to set a ceiling interest rate as 
this may mean that some consumers would not be able to obtain credit at all."98 The 
Consumers' Institute agrees: "If people can service high-interest loans and want to take them 
out, we do not believe they should be prevented from doing so by the govemment."99 
This author agrees with the Ministry and the Consumers' Institute in this respect. As 
uncertain as an unconscionability provision can be, an interest rate ceiling is likely to hinder 
consumers rather than protect them, it runs foul of freedom of contract and furthermore it 
does not address any other potential cause of genuine unfairness. Nonetheless, it is notable 
that Ison criticises unconscionability provisions for their uncertainty. 
B. The disclosure provzswn.s 
A review of unfair contracts law in New Zealand, including recommendations for reform 
would be incomplete without a consideration of Part II of the Act. The disclosure provisions 
are very important in promoting prevention over cure, they are also probably more 
contentious than the aforementioned oppression provisions. 
Part II provides for disclosure of the contractual terms and other prescribed information in the 
case of contracts falling within the definition of "controlled credit contract". This definition 
includes the large majority of day to day credit contracts but the disclosure provisions apply 
to many contracts which do not involve consumer credit. The exceptions are very limited. 
They include: 1<x> 
(a) contracts where the debtor is a company with a paid-up capital of $1,000,000; 
(b) contracts where the total credit outstanding is or will be $250,000 or more; 
(c) contracts where the debtor is a financier other than a person who simply "makes a practice 
of providing credit in the course of a business carried on by him". 
97 Report, above n2, 73 
98 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, (1988) "Consumers and Credit: A Discussion Paper" Wellington: Ministry 
of Consumer Affairs, 87. Cited in Consumers' Institute Report, above n5, 25 
99 Consumers' Institute Report, above n5, 29 
100 Credit Contracts Act 1981, s. 15 
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Under section 22, the borrower in a controlled credit contract can cancel the contract within 3 
working days of having received initial disclosure. This gives the borrower a "cooling-off 
period" after they have all the details of the contract to decide whether they want to continue 
with the 'loan'. 
As it stands now, the Credit Contracts Act requires urgent review. There is, ... , a widespread 
feeling that the Act imposes documentation technicalities which , though generally not as 
difficult to comply with as first thought, serve little or no practical purpose. 101 
The "total cost of credit" measure is a mislabelling as not all the costs of credit are included in 
it. Charges such as premiums for loan-repayment insurance or legal fees imposed by the 
lender are excluded, but may form part of a credit contract. The Consumers' Institute Report 
points out102 that the simplified calculation of the finance rate contained in the Act gives a 
misleading impression of the cost of credit. Furthermore finance rates are not calculated for 
"revolving-credit facilities" (credit facilities such as bank overdrafts , budget accounts, and 
credit cards), the argument being quoting a finance rate for such loans is impossible as the 
structure of the Joan is not known in advance. 103 Thus consumers can not compare accurately 
the cost of using these facilities with the cost of credit from other sources - one of the 
objectives of this part of the Act. 
The Jaw only requires that initial disclosure be made within 15 working days after the contract 
is signed. Some consumer advocates argue that disclosure that occurs at the time the contract 
is signed or afterwards, is disclosure that has come too late to fulfill the intention of the Jaw 
as borrowers are unlikely to back out of the deal at that stage.104 Sarah MacKenzie, solicitor 
at the Wellington Law Centre contended for hire-purchase deals the cooling-off period is 
largely a myth: "[T]he customer must still pay for the goods, so will have to get finance from 
somewhere else and fast. This means most consumers are unlikely to cancel, even if the 
credit contract they have entered into is oppressive." 105 The most important elements of 
disclosure, such as quoting the finance rate, should take place before the contract is entered 
into. 
10 1 McLauchlan , above n68, 62 
102 Consumers ' Institute Report, above n5 , 42 
103 Consumers ' Institute Report , above n5 , 40 
104 Consumers' lnstirute Report, above n5 , 38 
ws Interview with the Consumers Institute, cited in Consumers' /n sritute Report , above n5, 38 
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Writing in 1990, some years after the Act's introduction, Burt contends that the Act is 
"plainly unfair in the way its disclosure provisions work in practice." 106 First because the 
disclosure requirements are too cumbersome, and secondly because the penalties for non-
disclosure are outrageously severe. Section 24 can render the security unenforceable and 
under section 25 the lender can lose all their interest. Burt cites three cases in support -
Anderson v Burbery Finance; 107 Patrikios Holdings Ltd. v United Fisheries Ltd. 108 and Emus 
Holdings (Auckland) Ltd v Pither. 109 The common feature in all three, argues Burt, is that 
the Court found no deception or moral failure on the creditor's part nor was the debtor 
prejudiced. "Yet in view of the strong terms in which the Act requires disclosure, the Court 
has in each case found itself obliged to impose a significant penalty". 110 He advocates 
leaving sanctions to the Fair Trading Act when the finance rate quoted is inaccurate and 
misleading. 111 
However, the courts do have wide discretionary powers under section 32 to reduce the 
penalties that would otherwise be imposed upon an errant creditor. The court is to have 
regard to, inter alia, the extent to which a debtor or guarantor has been prejudiced by the non-
disclosure. Stuart Walker in a case note on Freedom Homes Ltd v. Reelick112 states: "The 
High Court has restated the principle that section 32 is there to cover those situations where it 
would be unjust to let debtors use the Act to renege on financial obligations they have 
willingly assumed and understood." 113 Interestingly in all three cases Burt cites, relief was 
granted under section 32, yet the lender was still forced to pay a significant penalty. This 
author does not believe that the available sanctions are overly problematic given that 
discretionary relief is available. The problem arises because of the cumbersome nature of the 
disclosure requirements themselves. 
The theory of disclosure is sound. It improves the information (and therefore efficiency) of 
the consumer credit market. However the law has not successfully turned that theory into 
reality. The timing and quality of disclosure must be improved. By "quality", it is meant 
information that consumers can understand and comprehensive coverage, so that consumer 
106 Burt, RD G "The Credit Contracts Act and the Reluctant Judge" NZLJ July 1990, 240; 242 ["Reluctant 
Judge"] 
107 [1986] NZLR 20, upheld on appeal at [1988] 2 NZLR 196 
108 [1986] BCL 220 
IO'J [1987] BCL 11 
110 Reluctant Judge, above nl06, 241 
111 Reluctant Judge , above nl06, 242 
112 (30 March 1993) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 2483/89. 
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can see the true cost of borrowing money. In this w2y, consumers can make a truly informed 
decision as to whether they should enter into a particular contract. 
C. Other issues 
I. Complexity 
A good deal of the law is written m technical language that many consumers do not 
understand. This, despite the fact that the Act is meant to be self-policing and as such used 
by regular consumers. Not only is the Act itself complex, which McLaucWan argues is 
defensible; "It would be impossible to enact simple legislation regulating the day-to-day 
activities of the credit granting industry", 114 there is little awareness in the community of the 
purpose and significance of the information disclosed.115 Therefore, there is a definite need 
for a consumer education programme, not only with respect to the information disclosed, but 
also with respect to the individual's rights and obligations under the Act. 
2. Coverage 
To improve the operation of a market the law must cover all relevant transactions and exclude 
all irrelevant transactions. Consumer credit law in New Zealand does not meet this 
requirement. For example, McLauchlan notes that the disclosure requirements of the Act 
cover loans made to commercial organisations: 116 
What is the justification for imposing formal disclosure requirements where businessmen enter 
into large scale financing transactions involving say $200,000? .. . the present system whereby 
many arms-length commercial transactions have to conform, often at considerable expense, 
with statutory disclosure requirements is quite unwarranted. 
The Act is supposed to be a consumer protection measure, interfering in arms-length 
commercial transactions and imposing unnecessary compliance costs does not achieve this 
objective. The Consumers' Institute suggest amendment so that the law covers all credit 
113 Walker, Stuart "Disclosure requirements - discretion under section 32 to reduce penalties on non-complying 
creditor" Butterworths Conveyancing Bulletin 6(15) June 1993, 176 
114 Mclauchlan, above n68 , 59 
115 Mclauchlan, above n68, 63 
116 Mclauchlan , above n68, 63 and 64 
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contracts where the borrower uses the money for household purposes. 117 McLauchlan 
suggests lowering the exemption from the Act's disclosure requirements of transactions 
involving $250,000 or more, to $50,000. 118 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs would add to 
that home finance regardless of the monetary limit. 119 This writer prefers the brightline of a 
monetary limit over the term "household purposes" as this latter phrase has the potential to 
introduce further uncertainty, but it is important to include home finance as it is obviously the 
largest financial undertaking for most consumers. Thus the paper adopts the suggestion of 
the Ministry of Consumer Affairs. 
3. Fragmentation 
Consumer credit law is spread out over several Acts - Chattels Transfer Act, Credit Contracts 
Act, Hire Purchase Act, and the Credit (Repossession) Act. This makes the law fragmented 
and difficult to understand, especially for the consumer. Hire Purchase agreements 
invariably fall within the definition of credit contracts under the Credit Contracts Act and are 
therefore subject to the provisions of both Acts. However, it may happen that, although the 
Hire Purchase Act provisions have been complied with, conduct may be oppressive under the 
Credit Contracts Act. 120 The Ministry of Consumer Affairs 121 and the Consumers' Institute 122 
believe that all consumer credit law should be consolidated into one straightforward Act. The 
long promised personal property securities legislation should go some way to remedying this, 
but it is very unlikely to include the necessary provisions of the Credit Contracts Act, so 
separate legislation will still be necessary. 
D. Summary of suggested reform 
There is little doubt that the Credit Contracts Act 1981 is not working. The breadth and 
undefined nature of the term "oppression" has led to the courts, in some instances tipping the 
balance too far in favour of the borrower, and in others, giving inconsistent decisions. This 
is causing uncertainty and a lack of predictability for lenders. There is no consistent approach 
117 Consumers' Institute Report, above n5, 47 
118 McLauchlan, above n68, 63 
119 Ministry of Consumer Affairs (1990) "Working papers on credit law reform", Wellington : Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs. ["Consumer Affairs(] 990)"]. Cited in Consumers' Institute Report, above n5, 38 
120 Marac Finance v. McKee, (1987) 2 NZBLC 102,867 
121 Consumer Affairs (1990), above nl 19. Cited in Consumers' Institute Report, above n5, 30 
122 Consumers ' Institute, Consumer, Wellington, Consumers' Institute. Cited in Consumers' Institute 
Report, above n5, 31 
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or clear principles upon which courts base their decisions and around which businesses can 
organise their behaviour. 
The fundamental principles underlying court intervention in unfair contracts are the same 
whether they are credit contracts, or contracts of some other kind. Whilst issues of consent, 
bargaining power, and inequality of exchange will differ in detail and complexity depending 
on the kind of contract being considered, the analysis of whether the contract is sufficiently 
unfair to warrant intervention ought to be subject to the same analysis regardless of the 
subject matter of the contract and this seems to be the way the courts have approached the 
question of oppression under the Act. Therefore there seems no real need for a separate law 
of unfair credit contracts. 
However the Act was intended as a consumer protection measure so before blindly 
recommending a repeal of the Act it is necessary to assess consumer protection. In its 
briefing papers to the incoming Minister in 1996, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs claimed 
that: "Consumer and community groups consider credit to be the most widespread and 
severe of all problems faced by consumers." 123 This may justify separate credit contract 
legislation after all, for consumers. 
In terms of statutory intervention in unfair contracts generally, the only reason given by the 
Law Commission which has substantial merit is that "[l]egislation could promote access to 
and use of the law on a subject of considerable public importance and interest." 124 Legislation 
can also serve an educational function in providing an easier vehicle for publicity purposes 
than common law dicta. Both of these reasons are most applicable to the consumer. Even 
though this author believes there is sufficient protection from abuse for consumers in the 
common law and the Fair Trading Act 1986 ( demonstrated by the prevalence of that Act as an 
alternative head of relief pleaded in many of the cases referred to in Section III above), there 
does appear a need for separate statutory protection for credit contracts, limited in coverage to 
that sector of the community. A limit of $50,000 (inflation adjusted) with home finance 
regardless of the money limit for transactions to come within the Act would serve the 
purpose. 
123 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, ( 1996) "Briefing to the Incoming Minister" ["Briefing"] Wellington, 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Cited in Consumers ' institute Report, above n5, 4. (Emphasis added) 
124 Discussion paper, above n51, para 77(5) 
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Clearly even if we accept that consumers need legislative protection, the existing law is 
inadequate to achieve this. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs framed it thus: "Existing credit 
law in New Zealand is unclear, inconsistent, and consequently unfair." 125 The Consumers' 
Institute shared the Ministry's concerns and in its report on the "Reform of Consumer Credit 
Law in New Zealand" suggested wide ranging changes, many of which have already been 
noted. Rationalisation of consumer credit law into one simple comprehensive statute is one 
recommendation, which is clearly warranted, but requires coordination with the forthcoming 
personal property securities legislation. Better disclosure requirements are needed. It is 
necessary to simplify both compliance with, and the contents of, disclosure. Borrowers need 
to be better educated. No matter how simple and clear the disclosure requirements are, if 
consumers don't understand the realities of borrowing money and their rights under the law, 
any disclosure is futile. 
Most importantly, laws need to be better enforced. The Act does little to prevent sharp 
practices by those most likely to engage in them - smaller financiers who provide relatively 
small sums over short terms. The problem is that the victims of such non-compliance are in 
no position to take action, nor is it worth their while. The lack of provision for an 
enforcement agency means that fringe financiers can realistically judge that they have little to 
fear from non-compliance. The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
recommended that the Commercial Affairs Division of the Department of Justice should 
enforce the Act. 126 The Consumers' Institute recommend giving the enforcement job to the 
Commerce Commission as a supplement to the Act's self-policing provisions.
121 The author 
agrees with the latter suggestion. With it's experience in enforcing the Fair Trading Act, the 
Commerce Commission is an ideal choice - but will require sufficient funding for the 
purpose. However, the next section raises another independent alternative - an Ombudsman 
scheme. 
The most difficult recommendations to formulate, are those for amending the existing 
oppression provisions. If legislative intervention is justified, limited to the consumer, to 
protect the consumer then section 9 - the meaning of "oppressive" needs changing. As we 
have seen, the existing section 9 has produced uncertainty and, in some cases tipped the 
balance too far in favour of the borrower. An amended section 9 can at best only reduce the 
125 Briefing, above n 123, 5 
126 Report, above n2, 190 
127 Consumers' Institute Report , above n5, 1 
uncertainty to the level of the common Jaw, so I suggest a change that steers the courts to the 
common law for guidance. 
Remove the term "oppressive" and replace it with "unconscionable". 
(a) This is the part of existing definition the courts have focused on. 
(b) Removing all the other terms which merely confuse the issue and recording in the 
explanatory notes to the Act that the term is to be understood in line with the common law 
meaning of the term in its wider sense - that is including the existing doctrines of 
unconscionability and undue influence will enable as much certainty as is possible. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Act is limited to consumer transactions should ensure that any 
uncertainty doesn't unduly impinge on ordinary commercial bargains. 
VI AN OMBUDSMAN SOLUTION? 
Setting aside for a moment the problems in the substantive law of unfair contracts, in this 
section the author will consider an alternative procedural protection for those most at risk in 
credit contracts, those the Credit Contracts Act sought to protect - the consumers. These 
suggestions may, along with the proposed alterations to the Act itself, substantially fulfil] the 
goals of the legislation without unduly hampering commercial business. Furthermore 
enforcement of the Act is, as we have seen, a very real problem. An Ombudsman scheme as 
discussed below may provide an alternative solution to the concerns raised in this regard by 
many commentators. 
The limitations of a formal court system of adjudication include cost, delay and inflexibility. 
The typical characteristics of consumer disputes mean that such limitations are even more 
pronounced. Most consumer disputes are small. The cost of pursuing such a claim through 
the traditional court system frequently outweighs the value of the claim itself and the 
consumer is faced by an opponent usually more powerful, more experienced at litigation, and 
more likely to have the advantage of legal advice and representation.
128 These practical 
problems of accessibility to the law mean that any critique of the substantive law itself is 
somewhat erudite. Indeed the difficult issues involved in the substantive law of unfair 
contracts may be somewhat ameliorated by addressing satisfactorily the prior practical 
problems. 
128 Farrar, Ann "A Banking Ombudsman for New Zealand" NZLJ September 1992 320, 327 
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Enter the Ombudsman concept. The typical characteristics of an Ombudsman seem ideally 
suited to resolution of consumer complaints with respect to unfair credit contracts. Access is 
usually direct, informal and free of charge. Procedures are non-adversary and non-technical, 
reasons are given for whatever is decided and there is a range of possible recommendations 
available. Recourse to the Ombudsman is a last resort after internal complaints procedures 
and appeals have failed to provide a resolution. 
The Banking Ombudsman scheme took effect from 1 July 1992. It was the first of only two 
schemes to be permitted to use the name "Ombudsman". 129 The Banking Ombudsman's help 
is free. Anyone (including companies) dissatisfied with a banking service in New Zealand 
from a participating bank can submit a complaint. The office's Terms of Reference give 
jurisdiction to deal with complaints about all types of banking business normally transacted 
through bank branches. 130 However the Ombudsman cannot deal with complaints about 
general bank policy or about commercial judgment decisions on lending unless there has been 
maladministration. 131 The Banking Ombudsman has power to make binding awards of 
compensation up to $100,000 to cover direct losses. The Terms of Reference explicitly 
require the Ombudsman, in making any recommendation or award, to do so by reference to 
what is, in her opinion, fair in all the circumstances.132 Any applicable rule of Jaw is to be 
observed, and regard must be had to the general principles of good banking practice and any 
relevant code of practice. Indeed the Code of Banking Practice makes membership of the 
Ombudsman scheme obligatory to those banks that adhere to the Code. 
The relevance of the Banking Ombudsman scheme for this paper lies in its wide overlapping 
jurisdiction with the courts in the area of the provision of credit, guarantees and other 
"oppressive" contracts. In the last financial year mortgage or home Joan finance, business 
finance and consumer finance together accounted for 27% of all complaints.
133 The Banking 
Ombudsman herself takes the view that a complaint alleging breach of the part of the Code of 
129 The Chief Ombudsman must grant permission under s28A of the Ombudsman Act 1975. See Criteria fo r 
the Use of the Name "Ombudsman", May 1997. The other authorised Ombudsman scheme is the Insurance 
and Savings Ombudsman whose office commenced operations in 1995. 
130 Banking Ombudsman: Terms of Reference, para. I 
131 Banking Ombudsman: Terms of Reference, para. I 8(b) 
132 Banking Ombudsman: Terms of Reference, para. 16 
133 "Annual Report 1997-1998/ Office of the Banking Ombudsman" (Wellington, The Office, 1998) 6 
[ "Annual Repo,1"] 
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Banking Practice on provision of credit is a complaint of maladministration rather than about 
banks commercial judgment and is therefore justiciable. 134 
In Westpac Banking Corporation v. Kalbfleish, 135 a case whose facts preceded establishment 
of the Office, Master Gambrill observed: ' 'This case cries out to be referred to the 
Ombudsman." 136 The case involved the bank seeking to enforce an unlimited guarantee over 
6 years after it was given, to recover losses with respect to large sums lent to the guarantors 
partner independently and subsequently without the knowledge or consent of the guarantor. 
Thus the facts were very similar in that respect to those in Baxter and Clarke, and indeed 
"oppressive" conduct under the Credit Contracts Act was pleaded in Kalbfleish and accepted 
as arguable by Master Gambrill. 
A case noted in the 1997 /98 annual report of the Banking Ombudsman also involved facts 
similar to those in Baxter and Clarke. It concerned an all obligations mortgage, subsequent 
marriage break up and the bank viewing the mortgage over the matrimonial home as security 
for 3 business loans personally guaranteed by the complainants spouse independently and 
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage. The Banking Ombudsman was able, via the 
office's inquisitorial, independent approach, to resolve the issue satisfactorily for both parties 
without the need for recourse to litigation. 137 
Many disputes over unfair contracts, whether covered by the Credit Contracts Act or the 
common law, that would formerly have been dragged through litigation or indeed not 
addressed at all, can now be brought before the Banking Ombudsman. The office is already 
dealing with complaints over that most common of factual situations - the all obligations 
security executed by one partner, often over the matrimonial home, for business debts of the 
other partner. 
The success of the Banking Ombudsman leads to consideration of extending the Office's 
jurisdiction to cover all financial institutions and all forms of institutional credit provision. 
The U .K. Review Committee on Banking Services criticised the inefficiency or potential 
134 Annual Report, above n 133, 24 
135 Westpac Banking Corporation v. Kalbfleish (23 December 1993) unreported, High Court, CP 13/93, 
Master Gambrill [ "Kalbfleish "] 
136 Kalbfleish, above n 135, 2 
137 Case 3b, Annual Report , above nl33 , 15-16 
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inefficiency of a scheme that was not comprehensive in this respect.
138 In reviewing the 
Australian Banking Ombudsman scheme, Prof. Everett noted; "A voluntary scheme is 
obviously likely to be troubled by a lack of institutional coverage."
139 John Holloway 
agrees: l4() 
Coverage does seem to be something of a problem ... While there may be sensible, perhaps compelling, 
reasons to have the scheme cover more of the financial services sector, any extension of coverage 
beyond what is proposed could, from our state experience, present real problems in establishing and 
fine tuning the Ombudsman's operations. I think there is much to commend a building block 
approach. 
The author submits that the scheme has been running successfully in New Zealand now for 
long enough to build upon it. Statutory compulsion may indeed be necessary for coverage 
over those institutions most likely to indulge in questionable lending practices with unwary 
consumers. This does not appear to present substantial problems for the scheme. Flexibility 
should not be hampered under a statutory scheme as the Parliamentary Ombudsman shows. 
Secondly, the scheme does not block access to the courts in such a way that the ability to 
make binding awards is brought into question. The "Test Case" provision
141 enables the 
bank, at any time before the Banking Ombudsman has made an award, to give notice that in 
the opinion of the Bank the complaint involves or may involve an issue which may have 
important consequences for the business of the participating bank or banks generally or an 
important or novel point of law. Providing the Banking Ombudsman concurs, the 
investigation must then be discontinued and the parties can take the dispute to the courts. 
Furthermore, paragraph 18( d) of the Terms of Reference provides that the Ombudsman does 
not have power to consider a complaint if it appears to her that it is more appropriate that the 
complaint be dealt with by a court. 
However, it may well be that a more efficient and workable solution is setting up a separate 
Ombudsman scheme for other financial institutions not covered by either the Banking 
138 Recommendations of the Review Committee on Banking Service Law (the Jack Committee) , December 
1988. Cited in Everett, Prof. Di "Consumer Remedies and the Banking Ombudsman" Banking Law and 
Practice, 7th Annual Conference 1990, Banking Law Association, Melbourne (International Business 
Communications Pty. Ltd., NSW, Australia, 1990) 199 [ "Consumer Remedies 1 "] 
139 Consumer Remedies 1, above n 138, 200 
140 Holloway, John "Consumer Remedies and the Banking Ombudsman" Banking Law and Practice, 7th 
Annual Conference 1990, Banking Law Association , Melbourne (International Business Communications 
Pty. Ltd., NSW, Australia, 1990) 221 
141 Banking Ombudsman, Terms of Reference, para. 23 
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Ombudsman scheme or the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman scheme. This would require 
compliance with the Chief Ombudsman's criteria for the use of the name "Ombudsman". 
Extended consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, beyond noting that the 
author submits that the issue is worthy of further study. It is the contention of the author that 
the Ombudsman concept is ideally suited to the problems faced by consumers in the area of 
unfair contracts and the flexibility and inquisitorial nature of the office may alleviate the 
severity of the problems with the substantive law. Regard will need to be paid to 
harmonisation with a reformed Credit Contracts Act, particularly with respect to monetary 
limits. It may well be that this Act is an appropriate vehicle to statutorily legitimise the 
scheme. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent case law on unfair contracts from three different jurisdictions gives rise to an 
unacceptable level of uncertainty as to when a court will strike down a contract and the basis 
upon which such a decision will be made. Of particular concern are the decisions in Eu:1ers 142 
and Hankins. 143 
This inconsistency is unacceptable, but it seems, comes with the territory. More decisions 
like Wilkinson 144 where the court enunciates guidelines are required, as is a more 
commercially realistic attitude by the courts which does not place unrealistic burdens on 
lenders who have not engaged in any over-reaching or victimisation. Most of all a consistent, 
principled approach must be taken by the courts, with judges openly articulating the true basis 
for their decision . 
The author contends that rationalisation of the law is a positive, and useful development. The 
writer adopts David Capper's thesis 145 that the existing doctrines of undue influence and 
unconscionability can and might be profitably merged into a wider understanding of 
unconsionability. The court would have to weigh up the three key elements common to both 
undue influence and unconscionability of relational inequality, transactional imbalance and 
unconscionable conduct; and come to an overall judgment as to whether a particular 
transaction can stand. Currently there are increasing instances of the courts manipulating the 
142 Elders, above n44 
143 Hankins, above n7 
144 Wi I ki nson, above n 1 
145 Rationalisation, above n38 
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two doctrines to ensure someone who should win does so because of difficulty in allocating a 
plaintiff's claim to the appropriate category. This can only lead to uncertainty. 
The Credit Contracts Act and more recently the Law Commission's Draft Scheme 146 on 
"unfair" contracts both demonstrate the shortcomings of legislative intervention in this area. 
The problem is that it is extremely difficult to codify in statutory language the notion of 
unconscionability or unfairness without in fact reducing certainty and predictability or 
extending the net too widely or too narrowly. The only persuasive reasons provided by the 
Law Commission for legislation are its accessibility and education functions - both of which 
are consumer orientated. It is consumers who are most at risk, and consumers are the only 
group where legislation can be justified. 
The Credit Contracts Act even limited in its coverage to consumers, requires significant 
amendment. The existing disclosure provisions are complex, incomprehensible for 
consumers and incomplete. Consumers also need to be better educated as to their rights and 
obligations when entering into credit contracts. The Act is toothless in so far as it does little 
to prevent sharp practices by those most likely to engage in them. Furthermore the limitations 
of a formal court system are even more pronounced for consumer disputes, giving rise to real 
problems of accessibility to the Jaw. Therefore an enforcement agency, such as the 
Commerce Commission, must be given responsibility for ensuring compliance. 
Alternatively, an Ombudsman scheme may provide the answer. Whether by extending the 
coverage of the existing Banking Ombudsman scheme or setting up a new scheme to cover 
other financial institutions, this model of dispute resolution is already being successfully 
employed for many of the types of disputes the courts previously dealt with in this area and 
may well be profitably extended. Finally the "oppression" provision in this reformed 
consumer legislation needs to be changed to minimise uncertainty. The author advocates 
simply removing the potentially confusing references to "oppressive" and replacing them with 
"unconscionable". That is, relief is available for contracts and behaviour in procuring 
contracts that is "unconscionable". This term is to be understood and interpreted in line with 
it's wider meaning in the common law (perhaps as developed in line with Capper's 
rationalising suggestions) . 
The current Credit Contracts Act with its unhelpful definition of "oppressive" and Jack of 
guidelines has generated even more inconsistency in an area already rife with uncertainty. 
146 Draft Scheme, above n52 
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The Act is not fulfilling it's objectives. The meaning of "oppressive" is unclear, the 
disclosure provisions are cumbersome and incomplete, and enforcement of and accessibility 
to the law is inadequate. Reform is undoubtedly necessary, unfortunately however, if 
personal property securities legislation is anything to go by, this is unlikely to occur quickly. 
In the meantime, it is up to the courts to eliminate inconsistencies and provide guidance and 
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